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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to study the China1 s 
developing role in the international balance of power 
system.
Balance of power is traditionally defined as a theory 
of maintaining an equilibrium of capibilities within the 
world system. However, this is inadequate to explain the 
current world system and the new develpment of Chinese 
foreign policy. This is because Chinese power is growing 
in a system in which the superpower hegemony is already 
established. Therefore Chinese balance of power policy 
must be aimed at decreasing the relevance of the superpower 
struggle to the rest of the world rather than trying to 
balance the superpowers in a traditional fashion.
The current successful domestic economic reforms, the 
Four Modernizations program, and the open-door foreign 
policy have greatly increased China's national capibility. 
China believes that her developing role in the current 
international system will be identify with the developing 
countries of the Third World to protest the superpower’s 
hegemony and achieving the world peace.
CHINA'S DEVELOPING ROLE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER SYSTEM
CHAPTER I 
TWO MEANINGS OF BALANCE OF POWER
1. Traditional Balance of Power in Chinese History
Power, which connotes the political, economic,and 
military strength of a nation state, has been regarded as a 
crucial factor in the international political system 
throughout the history.
Traditional analysis describes power as the possession 
by a state of capability, assessed in terms of tangible 
assets such as military forces, manpower potential, 
productive capacity, resource endowment and geographical 
situation; together with intangible factors which include 
strategic situation, national morale, levels of technical 
skill, and political and economic factors.1 It can be said 
to influence a nation's stability, independence and 
prosperity? it also has the capacity to coerce and destroy 
a society and the state system. Even in ancient China, 
various states struggled for power and tried to maximize 
it in order to suppress rival states.
-^Margot Light & A.J.R. Groom, International Relations: A
Handbook of Current Theory (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher
Inc., 1985), p. 115.
2
3Early in the third century, the Chinese Emperor's rule 
of the Han Dynasty became corrupt. After some years of 
hard fighting, the entire empire was divided into three 
parts, and three independent states emerged. This period 
was known in Chinese history as that of the Three Kingdoms 
and lasted from 220 A.D. to 265 A.D.. This
forty-five-year of period of Chinese history was filled 
with severe conflicts. Whenever a dominant power tried to 
gain mastery of society and coerce the weak countries, the 
two weak countries would ally against it, and thus the 
balance of power was always seen in full operation.
According to Brougham, "the whole object of the 
balance of power is to maintain unimpaired the 
independence of nations".2 The balance of power 
represents "the mutual preservation of freedom and 
independence, by guarding againt the preponderance and 
usurpation of an individual".3 The founction of the 
balance of power is to prevent the establishment of 
hegemony and preserve the independence of nation states.
In ancient China, the military actions of the Three 
Kingdoms served both the security of each kingdom and the 
preservation of the balance of power. The fundamental aim
2Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power 
(New York: W.W. Norton Company Inc., 1967), p. 31.
3A. H. L. Heeren, History of the Political system of Europe 
and its Colonies (New York: W.W. Norton Company Inc., 1969), pp. 
12-13.
4of the balance of power was to insure the survival of
independent states. To preserve each kingdom's existence
was the main duty of the kindgdoms under the balance of 
power.
During the Three Kingdoms period, the northern part of 
China was controled by Caocao, who founded the state of 
Wei, which ranged north to the Great Wall and south to 
Yangzi River. In order to secure the survival of the
Kingdom, preserve state power, and achieve the state's 
well-being, Caocao implemented a policy of decentralizing 
the state power and pursuing the military dictatorship. 
One of his most famous policies was the creation of 
agricultural colonies. Under this policy, several tens of 
thousands of dispossessed peasants organized and formed 
paramilitary groups. They farmed during times of peace and 
were called up to the frontier when war occured. The 
creation of agricultural colonies helped to spur economic 
growth and to strengthen national power. By the year 2 52 
A.D., Wei had become the most powerful kingdom among the 
three.
In southwestern China, Liu Bei founded the state of 
Shu. Within his ruling circle, Liu had two close friends. 
They swore brotherhood and promised "to live and die as 
one in the service of their country and their people,"4 an
4Kuan-Chung Lo, Three Kingdoms (New York: Pomtheon Books,
1976), p. 16.
5allegiance that became famous as the Peach Garden Oath.
In southeastern China, there was another state 
called Wu. Both Shu and Wu were weak states and felt 
threatened from the North. In order to defend themselves 
against Wei, they formed an alliance to protect themselves 
from the domination of this highly powerful sovereign 
state.
In the balance of power system, the alliance was the 
primary means of keeping the balance. It was the commonest 
means of checking preponderance and preserving the state 
system. "It is by leagues, well concerted and strictly 
observed, that the weak are defended against the strong, 
that bounds are set to the turbulence of ambition, that 
the torrent of power is restrained.1,5 Through alliances, 
an equipoise of power is maintained.
The meaning of preserving the balance is that no state 
should be much superior to the others. All states should 
be about equal in strength. Nations should prepare for 
their defense, as soon as they perceive anyone becoming 
dangerously powerful. Failure to do so is "an inexcusable 
breach of duty".6
The prevention of hostile predominance was central to 
the balance of power. To create this equality and 
defensive preponderance was the aim of the balance of
5Gulick, p. 61.
6Gulick, p. 32.
6power system in the Three Kingdoms period.
For the sake of consolidating its own power and 
seeking hegemony, the strong and well-equiped troops of 
Wei started their expansion to the South in 253 A.D.. They 
invaded the Wu's territory, and extended their control to 
the whole country. Shu could not afford to see Wu so 
decisively crushed for it would become a threat to itself. 
Shu felt obliged to take care of Wu and to prevent the 
excessive aggrandizement of Wei for its own security. To 
prevent Wei from becoming too powerful was to protect Shu 
and Wu from slavery. In the famous battle of Red Cliffs, 
the combined forces of Shu and Wei successfully defeated 
Caocao's troops. Caocao was forced to withdraw back to the 
North.
In the balance of power, the best way to preserve the 
individual state is to preserve the system of which it 
belonged. The severe conflict between the Kingdom Wei and 
combined troops of Shu and Wu were the struggle of 
preserving or breaking the state system. Since the 
balance of power theory aimed at the survival of the state 
system, war was always regarded as a means of preventing 
the breakdown of that system. In the Three Kingdom 
period, preserving the nations survival took precedence 
over peace. The incidence of war was not evidence of the 
ineffectiveness or absence of balance of power, but that 
such incidence indicated wide spread practice of the
7balance of power, of which war was an instrument.
Geography used to be regarded as one of the most 
important part of power in Chinese history. The 
strategic position and geographical extent not only 
figured in the equation of national defense but
determined, at least in part, the resources necessary to 
sustain the population and contribute to the national 
economic well-being. Relative endowments of natural 
resources and raw materials may affect the power of a
nation significantly. States rich in raw materials are 
less dependent on the outside and hence less vulnerable to 
negative sanction. At the same time they are better able
to apply both positive and negative sanctions to 
opponents. In the Three Kingdom period, power was most 
directly a matter of territory and geographical position.
After the Red Cliffs Battle, Shu's troop occupied the 
province of Changchou. One of Liu Bei's sworn brothers was 
sent to be the commander there. Since this province was 
in the middle of the Three Kingdoms, its strategic 
location made it very important. Both Wu and Wei were
envious and in the following year of the Red Cliff Battle, 
Wu and Wei made a coordinated strike to Changchou. One 
month later, Wu and Wei seized it and divided the 
territory between them. Wu captured Liu Bei's sworn 
brother, and delivered his head to Caocao. Since the
8execution of Liu Bei's brother and military occupation 
violated the Peach Garden Oath, Liu Bei abandoned the
alliance with Wu and a revenge war followed.
After several years of fighting, the Three Kingdoms 
finally came to a tragic end. None of the Kingdoms 
succeeded in gaining the power to reunify China. Instead,
the Three Kingdoms were torn apart, and fell into the 
control of warlords. The dream of a unified China was not
realized until four hundred years later.
According to Chinese famous novelist Lo Kuan-Chung, 
"The empire, long divided, must unite; long united must 
divide".7 Potential conflict was permanent throughout
the Three Kingdoms period. The desire of a strong kingdom 
to dominate the weak kingdoms and the disequilibrium of 
power often resulted in crises. There is no reason to 
expect the potential for conflict to abate. Even though 
the peace is not the ultimate goal of the balance of 
power, such a balance can promote peace. To assess this 
possibility, it is necessary to explore the elements of the 
balance of power.
2. New Balance of Power in the Contemporary World
Balance of power theory, as traditionally defined 
above, is inadequate to explain the current world system 
and the new development of Chinese foreign policy. Since
7Lo , p. 3.
9World War II, great changes have taken place in the 
international system. Instead of the wartime's alliance, 
the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a 
worldwide competition for the political and military 
mastery of Europe, Asia and Africa, which was known as the 
''Cold War."
Since then the world had been dominated by the power 
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The economic capabilities, military strength and the 
enormous nuclear arsenals allow both the US and USSR to 
remain as superpowers with the unique ability to affect 
world stability and peace. America's involvement in both 
the Korean and Vietnam War, the Soviet's intervention in 
Czechoslovakia and the military occupation of Afghanistan 
and other rivalries between the two superpowers in the 
Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America clearly 
indicate that the two superpowers have established a 
hegemonic regime in the world system.
Within this new world system, where does China fit in 
the global strategic balance? And how will China's growing 
involvement in the international system affect the world 
power balance?
Since 1949, when the new Chinese government was 
founded, China has made a rapid development in its 
political, economic, and military capability. Especially 
in the last decade the policy of initiating an ambitious
10
economic modernization program and building up the 
nation's military strength enabled China to play a more 
active role in the international system. The desire for 
national power, international prestige, and economic 
prosperity has become the paramount goal of the country.
China's large population, extensive territory with 
rich natural resources, and its recent impressive economic 
development has forced a change in the global power 
balance. The growth of China's capability gives China an 
asset in the global power competition.
Because of its great power potential, China has become 
the most effective independent power in the global system, 
capable of exerting significant influence. However, since 
China's power is growing in a system in which superpower 
hegemony is already established, Chinese balance of power 
policy must be aimed at decreasing the relevance of the 
superpowers' struggle to the rest of the world, rather 
than trying to balance the superpowers in a traditional 
fashion.
Dramatic changes on the world scene have encouraged 
China to align closely with the Third World countries. 
Now China has endorsed a broad united front against the 
two superpowers' domination and rivalry in the Third World. 
This united front includes all Third World countries, 
regardless of their social system or political structure. 
China will also support the nations of world which are
11
subject to imperialist aggression, interference and
control.
The Chinese people believe that since the essential 
feature of today*s imperialism is rivalry and the open 
struggle for world hegemony, the contradiction between the 
superpowers is irreconcilable. Therefore, the Third
World*s and China*s most compelling security concern is to 
counter the superpowers* political and military challenge. 
China is determined to unite the Third World countries to 
promote the world stability by decreasing the superpowers* 
importance to the rest of the world.
China characterizes its own global role as that of the 
anti- imperialist supporter of the Third World. In the 
Chinese view, the Third World countries must overthrow 
colonialism and the superpowers* control over territory 
and resources and free themselves from domination and 
oppression. The awakening and growth of the Third World 
will be the major event in the contemporary international 
relations.
China believes that the struggle of the Third World 
countries against the control of the United States and the 
Soviet Union is the main feature of the international 
politics. And it has a significant impact on the 
development of the international relations. Containing 
the rivalry between the two superpowers and reducing the 
level of conflict therefore becomes the paramount goal of
12
the Chinese foreign policy.
Since China is the major force to balance the struggle 
between the two superpowers and the Third World countries, 
China pursues very distinctive balance of power 
strategies. As former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai 
predicted, China*s significant role among the developing 
nations will "successfully prevent the backstairs deal 
between the two superpowers to divide the world between 
them."8
8Michael Yahuda, Towards the End of Isolationism: China's
Foreign Policy After Mao (New York: St. Martin's Press, 198 3), 
pp. 197-8.
CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY
The development of the Chinese foreign policy has been 
characterized by major changes, which were made both in 
accordance with the domestic situation and in the context 
of changes in the international system. Briefly outlining 
the evolution of Chinese foreign policy may help us to 
understand the basic role that China plays in the world 
politics.
China develops its foreign policy in accordance with 
political realities, ideological considerations, the quest 
for security, and its needs and urges for economic 
development. An analysis of the development of Chinese 
foreign policy since October 1949 reveals four distinct 
stages of evolution: (l)the two-camp concept and alliance
with the Soviet Union; (2)the policy of peaceful 
coexistence among developing countries and Sino-Soviet 
split; (3)the Three World theory and antihegemony policy; 
and (4)the newly reformed foreign policy since 1978.
1.Two-camo Concept and Sino-Soviet Alliance
When the new Chinese government was established in 
1949, the United States and the Soviet Union had already
13
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developed their power to the point where they had appeared 
as the greatest powers in rivary that affected world 
peace. The competition for power and influence between 
the United States and the Soviet Union divided the world 
into two hostile camps, socialist and imperialist. 
Chinese leaders publicly endorsed the Soviet view of a 
bipolar world dominated by an intense struggle between 
these two camps. The Chinese role in world affairs from 
1949 to 1953 was largely determined by this rivalry.
During this early period, China and the Soviet Union 
officially formed an alliance. The first agreement signed 
by two countries was the thirty-year Treaty of Friendship 
Alliance and Mutual Assistance. This treaty expressly 
based upon shared security and economic needs, both 
countries agreed that, in the event of either of them being 
attacked by Japan or the United States, the other would 
immediately render military and other assistance with all 
the means at its disposal.
People may ask what was the impact for this 
allignment? And why China declared the policy of "leaning 
to one side"? By analysing both domestic and international 
factors, we can see that there were mainly three kinds of 
motivations underlying Chinese policy and the formation of 
Sino-Soviet alliance.
First, the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance was 
because that both countries perceived the common external
15
threats to national security. As Michael Ward indicated, 
the fundamental idea of alliances is that the alliances are 
formed in response to a perceived threat. Such threats 
create the cohesion through which alliances form and
persist.1 The most common hypothesis in the alliance 
theory indicated that the external conflict increases
alliance cohesion.
When CCP proclaimed the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949, the new Chinese leaders knew 
that their regime was still weak and vulnerable. The 
United States had filled the postwar vaccum in Asia, 
occupied Japan, and it was still linked to the nationalists 
in Taiwan. Despite the gradual steps the Americans were 
taking toward disengagement from China, Beijing's leaders 
believed that the U.S., with Japan as a base, still posed a 
potential threat of serious proportions, which Moscow's 
military backing could help to counterbalance. From the
Soviet point of view, since they also faced the most
threatening enemy ---- American, a Sino-Soviet alliance
could significantly strengthen the entire socialist camp 
and bolster Soviet postition vis-a-vis the imperialists 
not only in Asia but globally as well.
Second, the economic considerations were another 
factor of Sino-Soviet alliance. Although the Chinese
1Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of 
World Power," International Security. Vol 9, No 4 Spring, 
1985. p. 21.
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Communists dealed with rural problems quite successfully, 
they had almost no experience in administering large urban 
areas and developing modern industry. Determined to embark 
quickly on an ambitious development program, China looked 
naturally to the Soviet experience and were eager to obtain 
Russian technical assistance, advice and aid.
Besides, the economic embargo initiated by the United 
States against trade with China clearly compelled Beijing 
to become more dependent economically on the Communist bloc 
than it otherwise would have been. In late 1949, Mao 
rejected the idea that China could expect real economic 
help from the capitalist countries, and Beijing began to 
reorient China1 s economy away from the west and toward the 
Communist bloc.
When Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai stated about Sino- 
Soviet alliance, he indicated: "The generous and unselfish 
economic assistance on the part of the government of the 
USSR had made it possible for us to cope with the economic 
blockade established by imperialist states, and to insure 
quick successes in the work of restoring the economy. 1,2 As 
a result, many new economic ties reinforced the military 
and political alliance.
Third basis of the Sino-Soviet alliance was the shared 
ideology and world outlook of CCP and CPSU made it possible
2Alfred D Low, The Sino-Soviet Dispute: An Analysis of the 
Polemics (London: Associated University Press, 1976), p. 71.
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to form the alliance between two countries.
During this period both CCP and CPSU seemed to have a 
deep sense of common goals and to face common enemies. 
Both the Chinese and Russian leaders appeared genuinely to 
believe that the ideology could be the prime motivator of 
their foreign policies and the common values could unite 
the two countries and prevent serious clashes of national 
interests.
For most of the decade after 1949, the keystone of 
China*s foreign policy was its alliance with the Soviet 
Union. They not only signed a millitary pact that linked 
their basic security interests, but also developed far- 
reaching relations in economic, social, scientific, 
education and other field. In dealing with the rest of the 
world, China and the Soviet generally followed parallel 
policies. As Mao Tse-tung wrote, during the opening 
exhibition of the Economic and Cultural Achievements of the 
Soviet Union held in Beijing:
We are proud of the fact that we have so powerful 
an ally. The might of the Soviet Union is an 
important condition for the overall rise in the 
economics and cultures of the countries of the camp of 
peace and democracy, and an important factor in the 
struggle for peace throughout the world and for the 
progress of mankind.3
3Doak A. Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutuion, 1977), p. 36.
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2. Policy of Peaceful Coexistence and Sino-Soviet Split
In 1955, at the Bandung Conference, Zhou Enlai announced
the famous five peaceful coexistence principles --- Mutual
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual 
nonaggression, noninterference in each others' internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful eoexistence 
  as the guide for relations among the developing nations.4
In this Bandung phase of its foreign policy China had 
attempted to construct a united front consisting largely of 
non-aligned governments, in the expectation that under China's 
leadership such a diplomatic coalition would gradually erode 
American power in Asia and establish the legitimacy of Chinese 
interests and objectives.
As we observed, in the early years of the People's 
Republic of China was founded, the Chinese foreign policy was 
motivated by a profound sense of dissatisfaction with the 
prevailing international order. China's new leaders were 
intent on re-establishing her territorial integrity, regaining 
her freedom of action and developing a military capability 
commensurate with security requirements. The alliance with the 
Soviet Union Seemed provide China achieving these goals.
During the beginning period of Sino-Soviet alliance, the 
ties between the two countries seemed so close, the advantages 
of cooperation so great, and the costs of a rift so obvious
4James C. F. Wang, Contemporary Chinese Politics (New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1985) p. 272.
19
that there was every reason to expect the leaders in both 
countries would do everything possible to maintain the 
alliance.
However, the rift between two countries developed 
gradually, and in each major phase the level of conflict 
escalated and the nature of the conflict changed.
The origin of Sino-Soviet disputes can be traced to the 
Soviet Twentieth Party Congress in April, 1956, which was the 
scene of Khrushchev's famous denunciations of Stalin. 
Khrushchev also enunciated the new principles of the Soviet 
foreign policies, indicating that in contrast to Lenin's views 
transition to socialism was possible without revolution and 
that wars with the capitalist countries would no longer be 
inevitable as Lenin had judged them to be. Khrushchev's stress 
on the noninevitability of war, the possibility of a nonviolent 
transition to socialism, and the idea of peaceful coexistence 
with the United States set a new stage for the Soviet foreign 
policy.
However, none of these was acceptable to Mao, especially 
Khrushchev's assertion that peaceful coexistence had always 
been and remained the fundamental principle of the Soviet Union 
foreign policy. With this assertion, the Soviet Union had 
diminished the significance of the Sino-Soviet alliance, as it 
began to hold different view points on the external threat from 
those of China 's.5
5Barnett, p. 53.
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While the Soviet argued for a relatively cautious strategy 
toward the noncommunist world, Mao, proclaiming that the "east 
wind prevails over the west wind,"6 urged a more militant 
worldwide struggle. He believed armed struggles were necessary 
for successful revolutions, and in order to achieve the 
national objectives both the Soviet Union and China would have 
to apply increased pressure on the United States.
1958 marked a turning point in the Sino-Soviet relations. 
The Chinese launched the Great Leap Forward, which was based on 
labor-intensive, decentralized cottage industries. Each rural 
community was to develop its own industrial infrastructures. 
This was accompanied by a mass campaign to combine numberous 
farms into self-sufficient communes.
The project, pursued with utopian fervor, was meant to 
break a new, better and faster path to communism, rather than 
just following the model developed by the Soviet Union. Moscow 
viewed this with consternation: if it succeeded, China might
rapidly overpass the Soviet Union; if it failed, China might be 
a burden for Soviet. Mao broke an alternative trail, thus 
challenging the absolute authority of the Soviet Union. To 
Khrushchev, Mao "had aspirations to be the leader of the world 
communist movement."7
In the meantime, there was a crisis in Taiwan. Facing the 
nuclear threat from the United States, the Chinese sought a
6Barnett, p. 33.
7Barnett, p. 53.
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commitment from the Soviet Union for nuclear protection, but no 
Soviet support was forthcoming.
In 1960, Khrushchev stopped the Soviet economic assistance 
and suddenly withdrew all the Soviet experts working in China, 
so as to pressure China into obedience. This move had an 
extremely damaging economic impact on China.
By 1969, the tension between China and the Soviet Union 
had become so intense that the limited Sino-Soviet armed 
conflict broke out on a small island of Ussuri. The immediate 
consequence of these March border clashes was the intensified 
fortification of military installations on both sides of the 
border. These border clashes represented the final climax.
3.Three Worlds Theory and Antiheaemonv Policy
The demise of Sino-Soviet alliance changed China's foreign 
policy orientation. Paralleling the deterioration in Sino- 
Soviet relations was the introduction of a new element on 
Chinese analysis of international situation. In early 1970s, 
Mao introduced the Three World theory to form a new Chinese 
foreign policy. In 1974, during the talk with Kaunda of 
Zambia, Mao Zedong defined that the United States and the 
Soviet Union belonged to the First World? Japan, Europe and 
Canada formed the Second World; and the rest of developing 
countries belonged to the Third World. He confirmed that the 
socialist China belonged to the Third World. Since it had 
experienced the same sufferings as most other Third World
22
countries, China always support the struggle of the Third World 
countries against the imperialism, hegemony and colonialism.
What are the main features of the three worlds theory? 
First, the Chinese have discovered the world realistically in 
terms of the widening disparity between the majority of the 
people, who live in developing countries; and the affluent 
people, who live in the developed countries. The superpowers 
continue to exploit the people of the Third World by paying low 
prices for the raw materials from the developing countries and 
raising the export prices of the manufactured products sold to 
them.
Second, the explanation of the struggle between the First 
World and Third World, with the support of the Second World is 
well fit into the Chinese traditional ideological framework.
Third, China's policy of supporting the Third World was an 
integral part of China's policies towards the two Superpowers 
and an instrument for preventing the United States and the 
Soviet Union from freezing the international status quo to the 
detriment of Chinese interests. By supporting the Third World 
countries, China could make use of her enhanced international 
prestige in the Third World to develop a broad coalition to 
alienate the Soviet Union and gain additional leverage in her 
relations with the United States.
China regarded the Soviet Union as socialist-imperialists. 
In order to further its aggression and expansion, the Soviet 
Union was always trying to fool people by "flaunting the sign
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board of a natural ally of the developing countries."8 China 
warned the third world people to guard against the 
socialist-imperialist enemy.
Antihegemonism has become a major objective in Chinese 
foreign policy in 197 0s; one communique after another, signed 
by China and various friendly nations, has contained this 
expression in varying degree of intensity. China believed 
Superpower hegemony was the main source of instability and 
turmoil in the world and therefore, t- to safeguard world peace, 
the most important task for the people of the world was to 
oppose hegemonism.
The United States was viewed by the Chinese as the 
superpower which was striving to prserve its vested interests 
and which was thus less dangerous than the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet Union, the socialist imperialists, is trying hard to 
extend its sphere of influence. China believed that the 
Soviet socialist imperialist was more aggressive and 
adventurous of the two superpowers and is the major threat to 
world peace and security.
4. Triangular relations and the independent foreign policy 
since 1978
Early in the 1970s, when Henry Kissinger went to Beijing 
to arrange top-level talks, both sides began to explore
8"China and Third World," Beiiina Review. 18 Jan. 1971,
p. 12.
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rapprochement. During that period, to China the United States 
was a less formidable threat than the Soviet Union. After all, 
Americans were withdrawing from Asia soil, while Soviet troops 
were massing on the Chinese border. Rapprochement with the US 
would eliminate the danger of a two-front cold war. Therefore, 
the detente with US became a matter of national security. In 
1979, the full establishment of the diplomatic relations 
between the two countries brought forth a new era. Since then 
the new global triangular relationship has been established, 
which has dramatically changed international politics.
Following about twenty years of hostilities, in the late 
1970s China took the initiative and sought a new structure of 
relations with Moscow through renegotiations. In April 1978, 
Beijing emphasized that the difference between two countries 
should not hamper the development of normal state relations. 
Soviet diplomats was also ready to accept the Chinese offer to 
resume talks. The negotiating process began in September 1978. 
However, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it was 
not resumed until 1982. Since then, contacts between China and 
the Soviet Union in many areas have been expanding. In 1984, 
the Soviet top leader Arkhipov visited China, and the next 
year Chinese vice primer Yao Yilin made a trip to Moscow. 
Several new agreements were signed regarding the economic, 
cultural, and technological exchange between the two 
countries.
Why is the People's Republic of China interested in
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pursuing detente with the Soviet Union? This Chinese intention 
of mending the long-standing split with the Soviet Union has 
sometimes been regarded by the West as the Chinese playing the 
"Soviet card". Is this the case? In order to clarify this 
question, we should study the recent Chinese domestic political 
shifts and see how it generates the foreign policy.
In order to challenge a stronger power, a nation-state may 
undertake certain kinds of strategies, which involves 
increasing the capabilities through internal economic growth, 
trade, and increasing its military capiblity. In the current 
Chinese economic and political reform, China is trying to 
maintain a delicate balance between central political and 
economic control on the one hand, and individual initiative 
and reliance on market forces on the other. The economic 
reform brought about the changes in the Chinese foreign 
policy. The two emphases of these changes are to maintain a 
peaceful international environment and to open to the outside 
world through trade and investment. These elements of changes 
are regarded as the key elements of China's present foreign 
policy. By opening to the outside world and maintaining 
peaceful enviroment, China aims at winning more friends, 
gaining access to advanced Westen technology, and speeding up 
China's economic development.
The effort that China made to improve the relations with 
the Soviet Union can shift China's national priorities away 
from confrontation with foreign enemies towards domestic
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reform and economic reconstruction. Since China and the 
Soviet Union have the longest common border in the world, they 
must normalize their bilateral relations to lessen the 
possibility of military conflict in Asia. If the Soviet Union
were ready to meet China's three-point proposal --- no Soviet
support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea? the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and the reduction of Soviet 
troops along the Chinese border to their pre-1965 level. Then 
Sino-Soviet relations could be normalized, and this would be a 
great contribution to establishing peace and stability in the 
world. Therefore, China's policy to improve the relationship 
with the Soviet Union is certainly not the policy of playing 
the "Soviet Card".
It is important to note that the main theme of the Chinese 
contemporary foreign policy is independence. According to the 
Party secretary Hu Yaobang's speech, China's independent policy 
is based on the following principles: never attaching to
strategic relations or an alliance with any big power or bloc 
of powers, standing by other third world nations, opposing 
hegemonism and safeguarding world peace; striving to establish 
and develop friendly ties with all contries on the basis of the 
five principles of peaceful coexistence; and upholding the 
current foreign economic policy so as to boost economic and 
technological exchanges on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefit.9
9Beiiinq Review. 22 Apr.1985, p. 8.
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This new foreign policy bears three fundamental doctrinal 
changes. First, the "three world theory", which had been used 
in effect to justify a global "united front" against the Soviet 
Union, was shelved. China nevertheless continues to insist on 
the importance of the Third World.
Second, the doctrine of the "inevitablity of war" with 
the imperialists also was abandoned. Since this had been an 
area of severe disagreement with Moscow, the reversal removed a 
huge obstacle to an eventual reconciliation between the two 
countries.
Third, Beijing subscribes to the view that it is possible 
for China to have conflictual relations with socialist 
countries, just as it is possible to have cooperative relations 
with the capitalist nations. This shift anticipated a Chinese 
readiness to recognize the Soviet Union once again as a 
socialist country. It also anticipated cooperation and 
conflict with the USSR.
The new Chinese foreign policy shows that China will never 
align itself with any big power or bloc of powers nor will it 
succumb to the pressure from any big nation. China will also 
attempt to establish and develop relations with other countries 
on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. 
China regards itself as a developing, socialist country, 
belonging to the third world. It is China's basic foreign 
policy to strengthen its unity and co-operation with the other 
Third World nations. The Chinese people always have scorned
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the ideology and behavior that show dislike towards the poor 
and favour towards the rich, and that display arrogance to the 
weak and cowardice to the strong. In its actions, China 
upholds the principle that all nations, big or small, are 
equals. We share a common destiny with the other Third World 
countries, and we show good faith in our dealings with them. 
China supports their just struggle and upholds their 
legitimate rights and interests in international affairs. In 
handling their relations with the other third world nations, 
China strictly abides by the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence and never interferes in their internal affairs.
China's foreign policy follows the principle of opposing 
hegemonism and safeguarding peace. This policy is no temporary 
expedient, but is based upon a long term, overall strategy. It 
againsts whoever seeks hegemony. It may emphasize opposition 
to Soviet hegemonim at one time and censure of US policy at 
another? China bases their position on their judgment of the 
world situation, rather than on what is called an equidistant 
diplomacy.
The Chinese independent foreign policy is beneficial to 
peace and stability. This new policy has number of components, 
including improving relations with the Soviets? continuing 
friendly ties with America? and renewing friendship with the 
Third World. It is not true to say that China is seeking a 
position of equidistance from the two superpowers. According 
to Hu Yaobang's speech at tewlveth Party Congress, China
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opposes any state that pursues hegemonism and expansionism. 
On the Afghanistan and Kampuchean issues, for example, both 
China and the United States oppose the armed invasions by the 
Soviet Union and Soviet-backed Vietnam. However, the United 
States has met with opposition from both China and the Soviet 
Union in its support for Israeli aggression and for the racist 
regime in South Africa.
In terms of the logic of the triangular relationship, it
seems that any alliance or conflict between the Unite States
and the Soviet Union would be detrimental to China, and the 
improvement of relations between any two parties would be 
beneficial to the third. Therefore, China welcomes improved 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
There are no strategic relations between China and the United 
States and the Soviet Union, because of the difference between 
the foreign policy objectives of the three countries. As a
developing socialist country, China is most interested in a
long standing, peaceful international environment for the 
purpose of realizing the goal of the modernization. The
United States and the Soviet Union, as superpowers, have 
global interests. They maintain a military presence in many 
regions of the world, and contend with the each other for
overall superiority.
Since 1978 the Soviet leadership has embarked on a
long-term effort to achieve military superiority over the
United States. The world situation again will become more
30
tense.
China, with its one billion people, vast territory and 
rich natural resources, and devoted to a socialist 
modernization drive, is an important peace-keeping factor. 
Because it can best help preserve world peace and stability by 
pursuing an independent foreign policy for peace, the policy
has won the support of the Chinese people. And because the 
policy meets the desire of the people around the world who 
strive for lasting peace, stability and common development, it 
has received their deep appreciation.
CHAPTER III
A PROFOUND DOMESTIC REFORM GENERATE THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY
During the past decade, China has opened itself to the 
world economy in an unprecedented fashion. Overnight, 
China has become the newest industrializing country. The 
rapid development in the industry, agriculture, national 
defense, and science and technology introduced bold new 
domestic and foreign policies. In this chapter I shall
discuss the most current economic and political issue ---
Reform, and its implication for the Chinese foreign 
policy.
1.Ten-Year Turmoil
The ten-year "Cultural Revolution" that took place 
between 1966 and 1976 caused serious damage to China 
economically and politically. As Chinese leader Deng 
Xiaoping indicated, it is an economic, cultural, 
political, and educational "catastrophe" for China.
There were mainly three economic crisis during that 
period. The first crisis occurred in the early part of the 
Cultural Revolution. As the result of most government 
agencies and enterprises were under the nationwide
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investigation, the production was in a state of anarchy.
The total output value in industry and agriculture fell by 
9.6 per cent in 1967 and by a further 4.2 per cent in 
1968.2 The Second crisis took place in 1974 when the "gang 
of four" launched a political movement to criticize 
Confucius, which was actually directed against Zhou 
Enlai. The consequences of this movement caused the 
industrial and agricultural output value fell further to 
1.4 percent.3 Third crisis happened after Deng
Xiaopingfs second emerge from the government. When Deng 
Xiaoping took charge of the central administration in 1975, 
the economy started revive. However, the "gang of four" 
launched another movement so called "against the right 
diviationist attempt to reverse past verdicts"3 This 
time the political and economic damage was even more 
serious. The nation that had just been restored to order 
was plunged into chaos again. By the end of 197 6, the 
ten-year nationwide turmoil almost brought the Chinese 
national economy on the brink of collopse. The industrial 
production was of low quality. Agricultural production 
was barely keeping abreast of population growth. About 
200 million peasants were living in a state of semi-
2Guangyuan Yu, "An outline of economic development," China's 
Socialist Modernization (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,
1984), p. 6.
3Ibid. p. 7.
3Ibid.
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starvation. Continual harassment of intellectuals had 
left behind the science and technology and educational 
system in shambles. The economic "self-reliance" and 
political isolation made China’s economy fall further 
behind the developed countries.
The political and economic crisis became the catalytic 
event for the Four Modernization program in 1978. 
Realizing how backward it was and how far behind it had 
fallen because of the ten years lost in the Cultural 
Revolution, the new Chinese leader came to the conclusion 
that it would be dangerous to Chinese sovereignty in a 
highly militarized and technological world if they did not 
do something dramatic to catch up. The paramount goal of 
achieving the national well-being, raising of people's 
living standard, and the maintenance the power of the
state constrained them to take drastic steps --- working
towards the four modernizations.
2.Four Modernizations Program and New Economic Reform
The Chinese four modernizations program originally 
initiated in early 1975, when the Fourth National People's 
Congress convened. Regarding to the problems that 8 00 
million hardworking Chinese peasants were no substitute 
for advanced technology and unskilled workers were cheaper 
than industrial countries' robots, but they could not 
achieve the precision and quality demanded by the
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international market, Premier Zhou Enlai proposed a 
two^stage development for the Chinese national economy: a 
comprehensive industrial system by 1980, and a 
comprehensive modernization program in agriculture, 
industry, national defense, and science and technology by 
the year 2000.4 However, due to the interuption of the 
"gang of four", this program was pendent.
By 1978, the highly ambitious Four Modernization 
campaign was launched again by the new leaders. Based on 
a revision of the 1975 plan, the new modernization draft 
set ambitious targets for agricultural and industrial 
growth. According to the new plan, the agriculture was to 
remain the foundation with emphasis given to its 
development. With regard to industry, the key stress 
remained upon steel, feul, raw materials, transport and 
communications. Technological modernization was to be led 
by the completion of about 120 large scale projects.5 
Since the strength in the modern war is seen in the degree 
of modernization of equipment and the people's ability to 
use such equipment, it is essential for the military to 
acquire modern science and technology and build a 
modernized army.
4Wang, p. 214.
5Bill Brugger, China Since the "Gang of Four" (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1980), p. 103.
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Accompanying the Four Modernization program was an 
economic reform campaign. Since 1982, the Chinese leaders 
have embarked this profound reform program to overcome the 
bureaucratic rigidities, economic stagnation and growing 
technology gap that threatened to leave China far behind 
in the race for wealth and security. This reform, as Deng 
Xiaoping termed, was "a deep-going revolution" without 
which the Four Modernization program will never be 
achieved.
The previous existing system was criticized as too 
highly centralized, excessively rigid, and grossly 
irrational resulting in waste and low efficiency.6 The 
huge bureaucracy was marked by excessive complexity. Most 
government officials carried out orders of the upper level 
in a perfunctory manner and the economy was operated under 
separate administrative systems.
In resource allocations, the production was excluded 
from circulation and was allocated directly according to 
the central state plan. The central plan could not 
rationally allocate a whole nation*s material and labor 
resources. Therefore, products needed by society were 
often in short supply while the useless goods piled up in 
the stores at government expense. The waste was 
astonishing.
The labor employment system was also irrational.
6Editorial, Economic Daily. 19 Apr. 1983, p. 1.
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Workers were assigned to work by labor departments. 
Neither the individual workers nor the factories had any 
freedom of choice. The training and the employment was 
always mismatched. In addition, wages were determined by 
the state law and bore no relation to the labor 
performance. There is no material incentives in 
encouraging good work performance. This insufficient 
incentive system, "everyone holding an iron rice bowl", 
could hardly spur the workers to make their maximum 
contributions to the society.7
The new reform entails replacing the former system 
with combinations of centralized and decentralized 
decision making, of economic planning and market 
regulation, of macroeconomic control and microeconomic 
flexibility.8 It is an effort to build a market mechanism 
into a socialist planned economy in order to increase 
productivity, to achieve greater economic efficiency, and 
to stimulate the initiative of workers and managers 
through material incentives. As the new Chinese leader 
illustrated, this reform, called market socialism, is a 
part of Chinese self-perfecting process of its socialist 
system. It achieves the desired effects of stimulating
7Chu-Yuan Cheng, "Economic Reform in Mainland China in 
Comparison to Yugoslavia and Hungary," Perspectives on 
Development in Mainland China (Taipei: Institute of International 
Relations, 1983), pp. 254-5.
8Beiiinq Review. 23 June 1986, p. 7.
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productivity and efficiency. This transformation involves 
not only changes in patterns of management but also in 
relationship of ownership.
The most dramatic reforms have been those in
agriculture, especially the adoption of the "responsibility 
system" based on household countracts, which for all
practical purposes has ended agricultural collectivization 
and has been a major factor boosting farm output to new 
hights. The new system allow each household to contract 
with government to produce a certain amount of product on a 
given piece of land. Whatever was produced in excess of 
the target amount could be disposed of at a higher or 
free-market price. Anyone can become wealthy through hard 
work. The implementation of the reform enables China's
economy to function within a new framwork.
The "market" and "responsibility" system has been 
given a major role in agriculture as a result of these 
reform. The success in increasing agricultural output 
made the Chinese leaders embark on similar reform in the 
industrial and other sectors. Urban and industrial 
reforms, which aim at increasing enterprise autonomy, 
reducing central planning, and expanding the role of market 
forces, was also developing.
Another important move of the reform was the decision 
to end China's isolation and expand foreign economic 
relations ---  by developing international trade importing
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technology, promoting exports, training Chinese in the 
West, borrowing abroad, encouraging foreign investments in 
China and establishing special economic zones in several 
sectors to stimulate trade and investment.
3.Domestic Reform as a Constraint on Chinese Foreign 
Policy
One country's domestic factors, such as the level of 
economic development, the success of economic programs, and 
the attitudes of the people toward the outside world 
combine with international circumstances to create a 
nation's foreign policy.
At present, the fundamantal task of the domestic 
reform in China is to develop the productive forces, 
improve the people's well-being and their cultural life, 
and eventually realize the Four Modernizations. These 
internal goals generate two main themes of current Chinese 
foreign policy. One is to open to the outside world, the 
other is to pursue an independent foreign policy of 
peace.9 People may ask why it is essential to have the 
open door policy in order to achieve the reform success. 
There are basically four reasons: First, China
acknowledged the central role that international 
scientific and technical cooperation will play in Chinese 
economic and military development. They believe that 
there are five important contributions which science and
9Beiiinq Review. 23 June. 1986, p. 14.
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technology import can make for the Four Modernization 
program. l)The technology imports help accelerate the
technical transformation of firms and strengthen the 
capacity for self-reliance; 2)they assist in the rapid 
expansion of exports; 3)they shorten the time it takes to 
carry out experiments or conduct research; 4)they offer 
learning opportunities regarding the management of 
technology; 5)they provide a context for training new 
technical personnel.^ Therefore, the essential part of 
China*s long-term development depends on expanding its 
science and technology relations with the industrialized 
world.
Secondly, international experience shows that 
under given conditions rational utilization of foreign 
funds is an effective means to speed up economic growth. 
Since China has a huge population but a poor economic 
foundation, it requires huge investment for the economic 
development. Under the open door policy, it is advisable 
to import foreign capital as a complementary source of 
funds for China*s economic construction. Strengthening 
economic relations with advanced industrial countries, 
using foreign capital, loans, aid, and setting up 
processing zones where imported materials are assembled can 
speed up the internal economic growth. Besides,
10Denis Fred Simon, "The role of science and technology in 
China*s foreign relations,'* China and the World (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984), pp. 294-5.
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establishing joint ventures in China with multi-national 
corporations; joining the international Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank? accepting long-term foreign loans can also 
promote the realization of the Four Modernizations 
program.
Thirdly, as a source of advanced management skills, 
the developed countries can introduce much of the advanced 
mangement methord which China needs for its modern system 
transformation. By utilizing foreign experiences, China 
can gain her own managing method.
Fourthly, to speed up economic construction, China 
must open to the outside world and expand her foreign 
trade. With regard to international economic relations, 
this calls for China to become integrated with the world 
market system for purpose of gaining access to foreign 
capital.
In pursuing the reform program, Chinese current 
leaders are constrained to implement the open door policy, 
so as to ensure a sustained and steady growth of the 
national economy.
According to Waltz, "Each state arrives at policies 
and decides on actions according to its own internal 
processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very 
presence of other states as well as by interactions with
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them."11 On the one hand China was conpelled to improve 
her relations with developed countries, so as to achieve 
the reform success; on the other hand, the external 
environment also provides constraints and opportunities 
on China’s behavior. In order to ensure that China 
concentrates on uninterrupted reform and the economic 
development, China must pursue an indpendent foreign 
policy of peace.
The development in peace is the common aspiration of 
the people of all nations. It is also the strong desire 
of the one billion Chinese people. Having suffered great 
hardships under foreign aggression and repeated wars for 
more than a century, China has not yet completely lifted 
itself from poverty and backwardness. It is impossible 
for China to bridge the economical gap between China and 
the developed countries without decades or even a century 
of peaceful economic development. Therefore, China are 
determined to carry on the independent foreign policy and 
work together with people of the world over to prevent the 
outbreak of war.12
With regard to the main content of China’s foreign 
policy the Party Secretary Hu Yaobang summarized in three 
basic points: first, China support everything that is in
11Samuel S. Kim, China and the World (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1984), p. 83.
12"Peace, Prosperity Nation's goals --- Hu," China Daily. 12
June. 1986, p. 4.
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the interests of world peace and stability and oppose all 
acts of hegemonism. Secondly, China will never attach
itself to any superpower. Thirdly, China is willing to 
develop friendly relations with all countries of the world 
on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, and support the Third World countries.13
China’s economic reform is changing the face of this
one billion people as no force has ever done before. The
revolution of the modernization in China not only have 
provided the perspectives on China's path of economic 
development, but also appeared the new significant role 
China play in the world.
13Ibid.
CHAPTER IV
CHINA'S GROWING POWER IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD SYSTEM
1.Balance of Power and the Independent Foreign Policy
The independent foreign policy is the basic goal that 
China has been pursuing in today's international affairs. 
On his journey to West Europe, the previous Party 
secretary Hu Yaobang further elaborated on what was meant 
by the independent foreign policy. In his speech, he
declared that the Chinese independent foreign policy was 
to support all the affairs which are in the interests of 
world peace; to oppose all the acts of hegemonism, no 
matter which country it was; to develop friendly relation 
with all the nations on the basis of the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence; and China would never attach 
itself to any superpower, nor will it make alliance with 
them. 1
In the past few years, Hu Yaobang also mentioned that 
China "has shown the world by deeds that China never 
attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and 
never yields to pressure from any big powers. It has 
always been China's long-term strategy not to be swayed by 
expediency or by anybody's instigation or provocation.112
^People's Daily. June. 12, 1986.
2Wang, p. 276.
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Hu's remarks were preceded by Deng Xiaoping*s opening 
statement, in which he warned: "No foreign country can
expect China to be its vassal or expect it to swallow any 
bitter fruit detrimental to its interest."3
The independent foreign policy has three main aspects. 
One obvious intention is that China will not align itself 
with either of the two superpowers, nor will it succumb to 
pressure from any big nation.
The other important point is that China strongly 
opposes the superpowers* hegemony. China believes that the 
cause of the current tension and turbulence in the world 
lies in the scramble between the two superpowers. Many 
local wars result from the Soviet Union's strategic 
deployment around the world in competition with the United 
States. The superpowers interference and competition will 
lead to the war. As Hu Yaobang indicates, "the superpower 
hegemonism was the main source of instability and turmoil 
in the world and therefore, to safeguard world peace, the 
most important task for the people of the world today is to 
oppose hegemonism."4
The third important aspect is to strengthen the unity 
with the third world countries and support their struggle 
to safeguard their national independence, develop their 
economies and eliminate superpowers interference.
3Ibid.
4Ibid. p. 279.
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The Chinese independent foreign policy not only refers 
to its own national interests but also reflects the 
challenge in the international system. The contemporary 
international system is characterized by some political 
scientists as a bipolar system. Within this system the 
United States and the Soviet Union, as the two dominant 
powers, make the two polars roughly balanced. Under the 
bipolar system, the idea of establishing a world empire 
through collusion would probably be unattractive to either 
superpower because of the mutual distrust? and the idea of 
building a single power dominant regime through conquering 
the other superpower is also unlikely because of the heavy 
costs of the war.5 Therefore, maintaining the power 
balance becomes the most important factor for the system.
In the bipolar system two superpowers are possessing 
such superior capabilities that other states are drawn to 
them for protection and other benefits. Various countries 
in the world usually have to lean to either one side or 
the other. However, where does China fit within this 
global bipolar structure? And can China still retain her 
own independent foreign policy?
After the People*s Republic of China was founded in 
1949, China's endorsment of the Soviet "two camps" theory, 
its anti- America policy and the US response to China
5Michael Ng-Quinn, "International Systemic Constraints on 
Chinese Foreign Policy", China and the World (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1984), p. 97.
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resulted in rigid polarization in the power politics.
However, in spite of China's relatvely weak economic 
and military capibility as compared to those of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, China had a potential major 
effect on the world system. In terms of national power, 
China's large population, tremendous natural resources and 
the unique geopolitical position become significant
elements in shaping the power configuration.
By the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Vietnam 
war proved that China could weaken both superpowers and 
force the changes in the bipolar structure of the 
international system. While debilitating the two
superpowers, China became recognized as a leader of the 
Third World movement, which promised to join forces and 
rally the poor nations against the the domination of the 
superpowers. The result of this movement was that the 
world that was once two blocs based upon a system 
dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union became 
three parts. The poor and the nonaligned majority 
countries were separated from the domination of the two 
blocs.
A "third force" emerged on the global level shaped the 
basic power pattern of the world. This third force 
comprising the Asian, Afrian, and Latin American 
countries. They have varying political and ideological 
orientation but share a desire to oppose the superpowers
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hegemonism and change the postwar international system 
dominated by them.
According to the theory of balance of power, the 
purpose of it is to prevent the establishment of a 
universal hegemony, insure the stability and mutual 
security in the international system, and strengthen the 
peace by deterring war. The policy of aggression and 
expansion would meet with the formation of a 
counter-coalition.6
The Chinese anti-hegemony independent foreign policy 
is based on this fundamental principle. The concept of a 
united front of the Third World nations directed against 
the interventionist policies of the two superpowers has 
implied that China will maximize her strategic position 
vis-a-vis the challenge of the United States and the 
Soviet Union.
Like the power balancing in the Chinese Three Kingdoms 
period, the traditional balance of power protests against 
the individual hegemony. However, the current new 
strategy of Chinese balance of power is to protest against 
hegemonic competition of the Soviet Union and the United 
States.
China views the competition between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in the Third World as one of the most
6James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories 
of International Relations (The United States: J.B. Lippincott
Company, 1971), p. 34.
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dangerous factors threatening the world peace. As the two 
superpowers increase their military spending, they force 
the developing countries to do the same to protect 
themselves against outside aggression. The deterioration 
relations between the superpowers and the Third World 
countries bring about regional turbulance and conflict, 
giving the big powers more opportunities for interference 
and intervention. It is also further intensifies the 
opposition between the two superpowers.
The Third World countries occupy a vast territory and 
possess three-fourths of the world's population and huge 
natrual resources. Having shaken off the yoke of 
colonialism, they now are facing the task of safeguarding 
their national independence and state sovereignty, while 
developing their national economies. The two superpowers 
intervention in the third world jeopardized their national 
security.
China viewed itself belonging to the Third World. 
Because China has had similar experiences and faces common 
tasks for development, it has a deeper sympathy for and 
gives firmer support to other third world countries. The 
increased Chinese national power will help the Third World 
countries to free themselves from the superpowers' 
domination and achieve their national independence.
As Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping indicated, the Third 
World countries are the main force for the prevention of
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war and the maintenance of peace.7 They are also the 
indispensable factor for the development and common 
prosperity of the world. The growth of the Third World 
will be a major event in contemporary world history, and 
its influence on the whole international situation will be 
significant.
The China' s present implementation of the four 
modernizations program and the new economic reform has 
enhanced various aspects of its capability, especially in 
the economic and military fields. It will be the only 
power which is able to exercise a major influence on the 
strategic central balance between the two superpowers and 
the Third World nations by its independent actions. It 
will also "accomplish what no other nation could, the
destruction of the bipolar system."8
2. China's Role in the New World System
In the most recent decade, the successful domestic 
economic reforms and the Four Modernizations program have
greatly increased China's national capibility and
gradually transfered China from a weak nation to
relatively strong country. Now China is no longer an 
outsider in international politics. Rather, it has
7People's Daily. 21 June. 1986, p. 7.
8Franklin Copper, China's Global Role (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1980), p. 4.
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attained substantial international status, achieving 
greater political and economic power, and playing an 
important role in the internaitonal system.
China's role in today's world system is related to the 
two superpowers and the Third World countries. China 
believes that currently the First World is declining and 
the Third World including China is rising. As Dr. Samuel 
Kim indicates, "Whether there is a united-front 
antihegemonic struggle or not, the world is already on the 
trajectory of system transformation from bipolarity to 
multipolarity owing to the steady and irreversible 
decline in the hegemonic strength of the superpowers."9
There are three reasons for the superpowers' decline.
First, the economic power balance has started to shift 
from the First World to the Second and Third World. (See 
the following table.)10
9Samuel Kim, P.205.
10Ibid. p. 204.
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Changing proportion of world GNP (Percentage)
First World Second & Third World
39.9
34.2
30.0
57.0
53 .5
47.3
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990
Second, in the world economic system, which is 
dominated by the two superpowers, the vast majority of 
developing countries supply raw materials. The 
superpowers deliberately force down the export price of 
raw materals from developing countries and limit import of 
manufacture products, leaving most developing countries 
debt-ridden.11 The nature of this system is most 
unequal. As a result, the gap between the rich and poor 
is widening, and hunger and poverty continue to plague 
many developing countries. This superpower dominated 
economic system will soon be overthrown. The economic 
development of the Third and Second World will bring about
11Beiiinq Review. 26 Nov. 1984, p. 17.
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a new economic order.
Third, as the United States and the Soviet Union 
continue to expand the arms race to maintain their 
dominance in the world, "they merely deepen the
contradictions between wishes and ablilities, between 
overseas commitments and economic capabilities. 1,12 The 
gap between their increasing hegomonic requirements and 
their capabilities prevent them from carrying out their 
ambitious desire of dominating the world.
The decline of the two superpowers, and the rise of 
the independent Third World has changed the world 
structure. In the new world structure the paramount goal 
of Chinese foreign policy is to oppose hegemonism, 
identify with the Third World, and create a united front 
against the superpowers’ expansion.
China views today’s international politics as a 
worldwide struggle against imperialist hegemony. Chinese 
leaders are seeking to preserve a high degree of 
independence and initiative in their international 
conduct, and have tended to identify China with the 
developing countries of the Third World, rather than with 
two superpowers.13 However, China will maintain an active 
dialogue with each superpower, avoid confrontation with
12Samuel Kim, p. 205.
13Ibid. p. 214.
53
them, and align with neither.14 This policy is well
fitted to an international environment which is becoming 
more multipolar in character. It also suits the Chinese 
desire to achieve a high level of independence in its 
foreign affairs.
In addition, China believes that the local conflicts 
in the Third World create opportunities for both Soviet 
and American intervention. Therefore, Chinese diplomacy 
consists to persuade the Third World countries to settle 
the differency among themselves and avoid conflicts. 
China1s diplomacy has been instrumental in reducing the 
intensity of local sources of conflict.
The developments in Sino-America and Sino-Soviet 
relations were also designed to permit China to strike an 
independent position between the two superpowers. Chinese 
foreign policy contains both echoes of the past and 
strikes off in new directions.15 China's support of the 
other developing countries and its firm resistence of the 
hegemonism of both superpowers are highly reminiscent of 
the current foreign policy. In the relations with the two 
supperpowers, China is trying to avoid any implication 
that it is aligned with or a partner of any one. However 
it is much different from the "isolationist" foreign
14Ibid. p. 216.
15Harry Harding, China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s (The 
United States: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 200.
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policy of the 1960s. China's position was to oppose the 
initiatives of both superpowers. China also believes that 
it is possible to pursue a parallel policy with the 
Soviet and agree with American on the other. As one 
Chinese writers described:
In the struggle between the Soviet Union and the 
United States for world hegemony, China may adopt a similar 
attitude with this or that superpower on this or that 
issue, and have a certain "point of meeting." But its 
point of departure in determing its position is 
different.16
China will be very actively engaged in dialogue with 
both the United States and the Soviet Union but will be 
completely aligned with neither one.17
China's increasing involvement in the world affairs is 
significant and its internatioanl influence will also 
continure to grow. It has been widely believed that with 
its great potential China is going to be an increasingly 
important force in the world politics.
16Ibid. p. 201.
17Ibid.
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